Inborn faculties


[1 of 2] Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804, Germany): primary subject "Philosophy, extracts" (search under Inner Life/Mind, Psyche, Soul, Spirit)": detail "‘Critique of Pure Reason: First Section of the Transcendental Aesthetic’ part 1, B (second version) 33"
Whatever the process and the means may be by which knowledge reaches its objects, there is one that reaches them directly, and forms the ultimate material of all thought, viz. intuition. This is possible only when the object is given, and the object can be given only (to human beings at least) through a certain affection of the mind.
 This faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations, according to the manner in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility.
 Objects therefore are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions. These intuitions become thought through the understanding, and hence arise conceptions. All thought therefore must, directly or indirectly, go back to intuitions, i.e. to our sensibility, because in no other way can objects be given to us.

[2 of 2] Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804, Germany): primary subject "Philosophy, extracts" (search under Inner Life/Mind, Psyche, Soul, Spirit)": detail "‘Critique of Pure Reason’: The Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements, First Part, section 1"
In whatever manner and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, intuition is that by which it relates to objects immediately, and that toward which, as a means, all thought aims. But intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; this in turn, however, is made possible, for us human beings at least, only through the object’s affecting the mind in a specific manner. The capacity (receptivity) to obtain representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone provides us with intuitions; but through the understanding objects are thought, and from it there arise concepts. All thinking, however, whether it do so directly, or indirectly, by means of certain characters, must ultimately relate to intuitions, and hence, for us, to sensibility, for no object can be given to us in any other way.
 The effect of an object upon the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by that object, is sensation. The intuition that is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The indeterminate object of an empirical intuition is called appearance.
 Within appearance, that which corresponds to sensation I call the matter of appearance, but that which makes it that the manifold of appearance can be ordered in specific relations I call the form of appearance. Since that in which alone sensations can be ordered and arranged in a specific form cannot itself again be sensation, it follows that although the matter of all appearance is given to us only a posteriori, the form of appearance must, for all sensations taken together, lie ready in the mind a priori, and hence must be able to be considered apart from all sensation.
 I call all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing is found belonging to sensation. Accordingly, the pure form of sensory intuitions in general, in which all the manifold of appearances is intuited in specific relations, will be found in the mind a priori. This pure form of sensibility will itself be called pure intuition. Thus, if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks in it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., then something still remains to me of this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which occurs in the mind a priori, as a mere form of sensibility, even without an actual object of the senses or a sensation.