Materiality or substance


[1 of 1] Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804, Germany): primary subject "Philosophy, extracts" (search under Inner Life/Mind, Psyche, Soul, Spirit)": detail "‘Introduction’, III, to the 2nd edition of ‘Critique of Pure Reason’"
Not only in judgments, however, but even in certain concepts, can we show their origin a priori. Take away, for example, from the concept of body, as supplied by experience, everything that is empirical, one by one; such as colour, hardness, or softness, weight, and even impenetrability, and there still remains the space which the body (now entirely vanished) occupied: that you cannot take away. And in the same manner, if you remove from your empirical concept of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which experience has taught you, you cannot take away from it that property by which you conceive it as a substance, or inherent in a substance (although such a concept contains more determinations than that of an object in general). Convinced, therefore, by the necessity with which that concept forces itself upon you, you will have to admit that it has its seat in your faculty of knowledge a priori.